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In this Article, James Bacchus describes his experiences as
a "faceless foreign judge" of the World Trade Organization. In
this capacity, Bacchus and his six colleagues on the WTO
Appellate Body hear appeals in international trade disputes
among the 144 member countries and other customs territories
that are Members of the WTO. Bound by the WTO Rules of
Conduct, he cannot comment on cases or the specific
deliberation process, but rather comments on the processes and
role of the Appellate Body relative to the WTO.

James Bacchus is Chairman of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization in Geneva, Switzerland. He is a former special assistant to the U.S.
Trade Representative.
He is also a former Member of the U.S. House of
Representatives, from Florida. In 1994, he chose not to seek re-election to the
Congress. In 1995, he was appointed by the Members of the WTO as one of the seven
founding Members of the Appellate Body. He is now the only remaining founding
Member and the senior Member in length of service. He is a Magna Cum Laude and
Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Vanderbilt University, Class of 1971, with High Honors in
History. He was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow at Yale University, where he received a
Master of Arts degree in History in 1973. He is a graduate of the Florida State
University College of Law, where he received High Honors, was a member of the Order
of the Coif, and was Editor-in-Chief of the FSU Law Review. This essay is extended
and expanded from remarks he made initially to the International Law Society of
Vanderbilt University Law School in Nashville, Tennessee on February 18, 2002.
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I am often asked, What is it like to be one of the "faceless foreign
judges" of the World Trade Organization-the WTO-in Geneva,
Switzerland?
I will try to answer that question, or at least part of it. I must
begin, however, by offering an apology to those who may be hoping for
exhaustive and revealing detail. I am bound by the constraints I have
accepted in the WTO Rules of Conduct. I cannot elaborate on past
decisions by the WTO. I cannot comment on pending cases in the
WTO.
I cannot offer my views on how WTO rules might be
improved-if at all-by being changed. If I did, anything I said could
rightly be used against me in a "court" of law-namely, the WTO
dispute settlement system. So I will say less, and in less detail, than
I might prefer ideally to say if I were free to do so.
All this said, what, then, is it like to be one of the "faceless
foreign judges" of the WTO?
We meet at ten every morning around a round table in a corner
room of a quiet wing of the Italianate Villa that serves as the global
headquarters of the WTO in Geneva, Switzerland. The windows of
our chambers look out on a broad green lawn that slopes down to the
shore of the lake of Geneva, Lac Leman. Across the lake are the
medieval heights of the old town. Beyond are the snowy peaks of the
Alps. We work in a picture postcard.
We see the sun stream through the windows of our chambers in
the morning. We see it make its way slowly across the southern sky
throughout the day. We see it sink slowly into the darkness of the
evening. Watched by the sun, we sip endless cups of a French coffeeand-milk concoction called renvers6 while we pursue the work we
share.
We have met around this table, morning after morning, for
nearly seven years. We began doing so in 1995 after more than one
hundred countries agreed on the treaty that transformed the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the newly created
WTO. 1 We were appointed then by the Members of the new WTO to a
supposedly "part-time" job that most of us do, in reality, full-time.
Since then, the faces around the table have changed. The table
has not. The same wooden table in Geneva, with its smoothly
polished surface, and with a few scratches here and there, has seen
both faces and cases come and go.
We are seven around the table. We are from seven different
countries. We are from seven different regions of the world. We are
from seven different legal traditions. We are, in the words of the

1.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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WTO treaty, "broadly representative of membership in the WTO. ''2 I
am the only American, and also the only North American, among the
seven. I am also the only one remaining of the original seven who
were first appointed by the Members of the WTO in 1995, and who
first sat together around our table in Geneva and sipped renverse.
Then I was the youngest, by fourteen years, of the original seven.
Today, I remain the youngest of the current seven. I confess that, at
53, I find it increasingly difficult to find pursuits in which I am "the
youngest." Having been asked by my six colleagues to do so, I now
serve as Chairman of the Appellate Body and, thus, chair our
meetings.
The seven original and founding Members of the Appellate Body
who first worked together around our table were: Julio Lacart6-Muro
of Uruguay, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann of Germany, Florentino
Feliciano of the Philippines, Said El-Naggar of Egypt, Mitsuo
Matsushita of Japan, Christopher Beeby of New Zealand, and yours
truly of the United States of America. My colleagues Lacart6-Muro,
Ehlermann, and Feliciano all served six years, and retired at the end
of 2001. My colleagues El-Naggar and Matsushita both retired after
four years, in 1999. My dear friend Chris Beeby died in Geneva in
2000 while working at the WTO.
The seven who work together around our table today are:
Georges Abi-Saab of Egypt, A.V. Ganesan of India, Yasuhei Taniguchi
of Japan, Luiz Olavo Baptista of Brazil, John Lockhart of Australia,
Giorgio Sacerdoti of Italy, and, still, yours truly. We are aided in our
work by the Appellate Body "Secretariat," which is a fancy way of
describing our very fine staff. For more than five years, the director
of our Secretariat was a superb international lawyer and former trade
negotiator from Canada named Debra Steger.
She has been
succeeded by another gifted Canadian lawyer named Valerie Hughes.
Through the years, numerous bright young lawyers on our
Secretariat have worked with us and joined with us from time to time
in the discussions around our table.
The subject of these discussions is what we call the "covered
agreements." The "covered agreements" are the GATT and the
numerous other international trade agreements that comprise the
WTO treaty and that bind all WTO Members. 3 We seven are,
according to the WTO treaty, "persons of recognized authority, with
demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject
matter of the covered agreements generally. '4 As such, our job is to

2.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 17.3, 33 I.L.M. 112, 125 [hereinafter DSU].
3.

Id. art. 1.1.

4.

Id. art. 17.3.
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help the Members of the WTO fulfill the terms of the "covered
agreements." Our job is "to clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law" as a final forum of appeal in WTO dispute
settlement. 5
We do not wear robes. We do not wear wigs. We do not wear the
white bibs that are often worn by jurists on other international
tribunals. We do not have all the institutional trappings that have
accrued to other tribunals with the passage of time and the accretion
of tradition. We do not even have titles. The WTO treaty speaks only
of a "standing Appellate Body."'6 The treaty does not say what the
seven "persons" who are members of the Appellate Body should be
called. So we call ourselves simply "Members of the Appellate Body."
Others do not seem to know what to call us. Some observers of
the WTO describe us as "trade experts." Some trade experts describe
us as "generalists." Journalists, in reporting our rulings, often
describe us generically and anonymously as simply "the WTO." And,
yes, some, sometimes, call us "faceless foreign judges."
We are called "faceless" perhaps because few in the world seem
to know who we are. Few in the world who write about the WTO, few
who criticize the WTO, and few even who defend the WTO, know who
we are. We always sign our opinions, but, for whatever reason, few
ever mention our names. We may be called "faceless" as well because
the WTO Members have mandated in the WTO treaty that all our
proceedings must be "confidential. '7 So we meet behind closed doors.
No one who has not participated in one of our appeals has ever seen
us work.
We are called "foreign" perhaps because we are, by treaty,
"unaffiliated with any government." We do not represent our own
countries in our work in Geneva. Instead, each of us and all of us
have been appointed by all the Members of the WTO to speak for all
the Members of the WTO by speaking solely for the WTO trading
system as a whole. We are independent.
And we may be called "judges" because, whatever we may call
ourselves, that word may best describe what we do. For our job is to
"judge" appeals in international trade disputes affecting the lives of 5
billion people in the 95% of all world commerce conducted by the 144
countries and other customs territories that are-currentlyMembers of the WTO. Moreover, the scope of our jurisdiction seems
to grow daily. At this point, every country in the world is either a

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.

3.2.
17.1.
17.10.
17.3.
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Member of the WTO or seems to want to be. At last glance, more
than two dozen additional countries had applied for admission in a
process we call "accession." China and Taiwan are the newest
Members. Russia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Ukraine are among
those waiting to become Members. Among the others awaiting
membership are about half the Arab states and a handful of former
Soviet republics.
Technically, the Appellate Body is rightly described as "quasijudicial."9 To have legal effect, our rulings must be adopted by the
Members of the WTO. But a ruling by the Appellate Body in an
international trade dispute will not be adopted only if all the
Members of the WTO decide "by consensus" that it should not beincluding the Member or Members in whose favor we may have
ruled.' 0 Thus far, this has never happened.
But whether our work is described as "judicial" or "quasijudicial," and whatever we may be called, we have much to do around
our table in Geneva. We have much to do because, among all the
international tribunals in the world, and, indeed, among all the
international tribunals in the history of the world, the Appellate Body
of the WTO is unique in two important ways.
The first way in which we are unique is that we have what we
lawyers call "compulsory jurisdiction." All WTO Members have
agreed in the WTO treaty to use the WTO dispute settlement system
to resolve all treaty-related disputes with other WTO Members. A
WTO Member that does not do so may be sued by another WTO
Member for not doing so in WTO dispute settlement. Thus far, this,
too, has never happened.
The second way in which the Appellate Body is unique is that we
make judgments that are enforced. Our judgments are enforced, not
by us, but by the Members of the WTO themselves through the power
of economic suasion. Like all treaties, the WTO treaty is in the
nature of a contract. Indeed, the members of the GATT, which
preceded the WTO, were often called "Contracting Parties." In every
contract, there are obligations and there are benefits. And, as in
every other contract, in the contract called the WTO treaty, if a WTO
Member fails to fulfill all of its obligations, it risks losing some of the
benefits of the contract.
The Members of the WTO are sovereign countries and customs
territories. No Member of the WTO can ever be required to comply
with any judgment in WTO dispute settlement. Yet, under the WTO

Quasi-judicial is defined as, "of, relating to, or involving an executive or
9.
administrative official's adjudicative act." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (7th ed.
1999).
DSU, supra note 2, art. 17.14.
10.
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treaty, if a Member chooses not to comply, it risks paying an economic
price. That price is what the treaty describes as "compensation and
the suspension of concessions."'1 1 This is a form of "damages" to the
other Member injured in that trade dispute. These "damages" consist
of either additional access for the injured Member to the market of
the "non-complying" Member in other sectors of trade, or reduced
access for the "non-complying" Member to the market of the injured
Member in other sectors of trade. As this can sometimes be a very
high price to pay, WTO Members have considerable economic
incentive to choose to comply with WTO judgments. And they almost
always do.
These two ways in which we are unique help keep us busy
around our round table in Geneva as we try to help provide what the
WTO treaty calls "security and predictability to the multilateral
trading system."'12 Our jurisprudential uniqueness is, of course, the
culmination of more than half a century of building the multilateral
trading system, first under the GATT, and now under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding that is the legal linchpin of the WTO
treaty.
We are also kept busy because WTO Members know that when
they bring a case in WTO dispute settlement that eventually reaches
the Appellate Body, they will receive a legal judgment, not a political
judgment. They know they will receive a judgment that will, in the
words of the treaty, "address" the "issues of law" that are "raised...
during the appellate proceeding." Nothing more. Nothing less. For,
in addressing issues of law in WTO appeals, we seven have always
been, and we will always be, as one observer for the New York Times
13
has put it, "impartial and unflinching."'
For these reasons, in the seven years since we began working
together around our table, the WTO has become by far the busiest
international dispute settlement system in history. As the treaty
says, "The aim of the dispute settlement system is to secure a positive
solution to a dispute" involving WTO Members. 14 And, as the system
has grown, ever-increasing numbers of trade disputes have been
brought to the WTO by WTO Members in search of a "positive
solution." Thus far, approximately 240 formal complaints have been
brought to the WTO, and more than 11,000 pages of jurisprudence

11.
Id. art. 22.1.
12.
Id. art. 3.2.
13.
Michael M. Weinstein, Economic Scene: Should Clinton Embrace the
China Trade Deal? Some Say Yes, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at C2.
14.
DSU, supra note 2, art. 3.7.
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have resulted from WTO dispute settlement. 15 These numbers are
increasing almost every day.
The parties to the proceedings in WTO dispute settlement that
arise from these trade disputes are exclusively the countries and
other customs territories that are Members of the WTO. No one else
is entitled under the WTO treaty to participate in WTO dispute
settlement. Private interests do not have "standing" to bring suits in
the WTO. But, of course, the WTO Members that are parties to WTO
proceedings are always of the view that they are asserting and
defending important domestic interests. Thus, for example, it is not
surprising that the journalists who reported on the dispute a few
years ago between Japan and the United States involving the
Japanese market for photographic film routinely described that
16
dispute as the "Kodak-Fuji" case.
In these first few years of the WTO, numerous trade disputes
among the Members of the WTO have been settled "out of court," so to
speak, by virtue of the very existence of a compulsory dispute
settlement system that can make enforceable judgments. Many of
the other disputes that have been brought to the WTO in its brief
history have resulted in rulings by the ad hoc three-member panels
that are the WTO equivalent of trial courts. And about fifty of these
disputes have resulted in rulings by the Appellate Body that have
been adopted by the Members of the WTO. Almost all these disputes
have been resolved with what the parties to the disputes have viewed
as a "positive solution."
Not without reason has Director General Mike Moore of the
WTO frequently described the dispute settlement system as the
"crown jewel" of the multilateral trading system. 17 Peter Sutherland,
former Director General of the WTO's predecessor, the GATT, has
gone so far as to say that the WTO dispute settlement system "is the
greatest advance in multilateral governance since Bretton Woods,"
the conference at the conclusion of World War II where the victorious
allies agreed on much of the architecture of the post-war global
18
economic system.
Given the broad scope and sway of the WTO treaty, the disputes
that are resolved in WTO dispute settlement can involve

15.

John H. Jackson, PerceptionsAbout the WTO Trade Institutions, 1 WORLD

TRADE REV. 101, 109 (2002).

See e.g., Nancy Dunne et al., WTO's Film Ruling Angers Washington, FIN.
16.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1997, at 3.
17.
The Director-General used this phrase, for example, during the "swearingin" ceremony for the newest Members of the Appellate Body before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body, in Geneva, on December 19, 2001.
Guy de Jonquieres, Rule to Fight By: The US and Europe Are Looking to the
18.
World Trade Organization to Resolve Their Dispute Over Steel, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2002, at 22 (quoting former Director-General Sutherland).
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manufacturing,
agriculture,
services,
intellectual
property,
investment, taxation, and virtually every other area of world
commerce. The appeals we have judged thus far have involved
everything from apples to computers, automobiles to semiconductors,
shrimp to satellites, bananas to chemicals, and oil to aerospace. Ever
more varied kinds of disputes are resulting in WTO dispute
settlement as more agreements enter into force, more agreements are
concluded, and more concessions are made.
Increasingly, the
"boundaries" of WTO jurisdiction are the subject of both political and
academic debate.19 But, clearly, the "boundaries" of the WTO are
both extensive and expansive.
We do not render advisory opinions on the Appellate Body. We
render opinions only when there are specific trade disputes. By
treaty, all WTO Members that are parties to a dispute have the
automatic right to appeal "issues of law covered in the panel report
and legal interpretations developed by the panel" to the Appellate
Body. 20 On appeal, we seven "shall address each of the issues
raised.., during the appellate proceeding." 21 We "may uphold,
modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel. '2 2 Thus, we cannot choose either the disputes that are appealed to
us or the issues of law that are appealed to us in disputes. Unlike the
United States Supreme Court, for example, we have no discretionary
jurisdiction. Further, we have no power to remand a dispute to a
panel for further consideration. We have no authority whatsoever to
decline to hear an appeal.
Moreover, we have no authority
whatsoever to refrain from "addressing" a legal issue that has been
properly raised in an appeal. The WTO treaty says that we "shall
address" every legal issue raised in an appeal. So we do.
And we do so within strict deadlines established by the treaty.
Most other international tribunals have no deadlines. But no matter
how complicated the issues may be that are raised on appeal,
generally we have no more than ninety days in which to hear and
decide an appeal. 23 As our record reflects, we take seriously the need
to "address" the legal issues raised in each appeal both thoroughly
and appropriately within the treaty deadlines. We have met our
treaty deadlines consistently, and I am persuaded that this, too, has
contributed to the success thus far of the WTO dispute settlement
system.

19.

(2002).
20.
21.
22.
23.

See, e.g.,

Symposium:

The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 1

DSU, supra note 2, art. 17.6.
Id. art. 17.12.
Id. art. 17.13.
Id. art. 17.5.
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By treaty, we have been granted the authority to establish our
own "working procedures" within our deadlines. 24 Seven years ago,
we sat down together at our table with a blank legal pad and began
writing our procedures. It'took us three weeks. Since then, we have
made only minor changes. Using these working procedures, in each
appeal, we review the panel record and the panel report, we review
submissions by the WTO Members that are interested parties and
third parties, we conduct an oral hearing on the legal issues that have
been raised, and we deliberate and write a final report containing our
judgment. And generally we do all this within no more than ninety
25
days
For; translation and other purposes, there are three official
languages of the WTO-English, Spanish, and French. 26 As a matter
of practice, the seven of us generally work in our common languageEnglish. We conduct our oral hearings in English-unless asked by
the WTO Members participating in the hearing to do otherwise. We
deliberate in English-embellished by the occasional Latin legal
phrase heard around the table. We write our reports in English. Our
reports are translated into Spanish and French before release to the
parties to the appeal and to the world.
We have been able to meet our deadlines in part because we
have shared our growing workload among the seven. By treaty, three
of us sit as a "division" to hear and decide each appeal. 27 Those three
sign the report of the Appellate Body in that appeal. Before a
decision is reached, the three on the "division" in the appeal engage in
an "exchange of .views" with the four others who are not on the
"division." One of the three serves as "Presiding Member" of the
"division."' By treaty, all seven of us "serve in rotation" in all these
roles, and, by rule, we do so on an anonymous and random basis that
28
tends to equalize our individual workloads.
Whatever our individual role may be in any particular appeal,
each of us strives always to reach a "consensus" in every appeal. We
are not required to do so. The treaty does not prohibit dissents. The
treaty provides only that "opinions expressed" by individuals serving
on the Appellate Body must be "anonymous. '29 But, thus far, in all
our years of working together, and in about fifty appeals, there has

24.
Id. art. 17.9.
25.
My colleagues would no doubt urge me to add that this is, actually, no more
than seventy-five days, as we must allow two weeks for mandatory translation.
26.
WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. 16.
27.
DSU, supra note 2, art. 17.1; WTO Appellate Body, Working Procedures for
Appellate Review, WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/3, Rule 6(1) (Feb. 28, 1997) [hereinafter
Working Procedures].
28.
DSU, supranote 2, art 17.1; Working Procedures, supra note 27, Rule 6(2).
29.
DSU, supranote 2, art. 17.11.
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not been even one dissent to the conclusions in any report of the
Appellate Body. Thus far, all our decisions have been by "consensus."
I do not believe that I betray the "confidentiality" of our table
talk in any way by saying that the "consensus" we have achieved in
the many appeals that have been made, thus far, to the Appellate
Body has not always been achieved easily. Nor do I think that I
betray any of our "confidentiality" by saying that our ability to
achieve consensus around our table in our first seven years is
testimony to the considerable care taken by the Members of the WTO
in the elaborate and global selection process they have employed in
appointing all the Members of the Appellate Body.
Some may say that there is no accounting for my own selection.
As one astute observer remarked in a letter to the editor of my
hometown newspaper in Florida shortly after I was first appointed to
the Appellate Body seven years ago, which I paraphrase here from
memory, "I don't understand all this fuss about Jim Bacchus. He is
just another lawyer from Orlando. 30° And so I am. However, my
colleagues on the Appellate Body have all long been much more than
"just lawyers." From the beginning, I have been joined around our
table in Geneva by distinguished international jurists of the very
highest order. They have, each and all, been legal thinkers and legal
craftsmen of the very highest quality. They have been students of
history and philosophy as well as students of economics and
jurisprudence. They have been seekers of the better world that yet
can be-if we succeed in our shared efforts to secure the international
rule of law. Today, I am still just a lawyer from Orlando. Yet
because of my colleagues, and because of all I have learned from them
while working with them around our table in Geneva, I am, perhaps,
more than I was seven years ago.
In our time together around our table, we have learned that the
issues that are raised on appeal are rarely clear-cut. Even seven
years on, there are many important provisions of the "covered
agreements" and, in fact, some entire agreements that are part of the
overall WTO treaty, that have yet to be construed even once by the
Appellate Body. Moreover, issues are raised in almost every appeal
that are, in legal parlance, issues of "first impression." In truth, it
might be said of the entirety of the ruled-based WTO multilateral
trading system that, in many ways, it poses a world of "first
impression." Given this, we seven are very much of the view that we
owe it to the Members of the WTO, and to all the people of the world
that we seven serve through the Members of the WTO, to examine

30.
A22.

Wayne Lindsey, Just Another Lawyer, ORLANDO

SENTINEL,

Dec. 8, 1995, at
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every last shade of nuance of every single legal issue that is raised in
every single appeal. And we always do.
That is why our hearings sometimes last for days, our
deliberations sometimes last for weeks, and our drafting sometimes
lasts for draft after draft after draft. That is why we meet, day after
day, around our round table. That is why we sit, hour after hour, day
after day, plumbing the depths of meaning of the words of the WTO
treaty, slicing the layers of logic in the interpretation of those words,
and turning over and over, up and down, and inside and out, every
last argument that may have been advanced about those words in an
effort to reach a "consensus" on the right reasoning and the right
result on every:legal issue raised in every appeal. That is why we
work together to forge a "consensus" up until the very limits of our
ever-present and ever-pressing deadlines.
As our current chairman, I preside over our general discussions.
Our practice also is for the "Presiding Member" of a particular
division to preside in the deliberations of that division and also in the
"exchange of views" with that division. As a practical matter, this
usually consists mostly of keeping a list on a legal pad of the order in
which we have each asked to speak about the many subtleties of the
WTO treaty.
The WTO treaty is not a free trade agreement. It does not
mandate free trade. The WTO treaty is an international agreement
It
for freeing trade and for preventing trade discrimination.
establishes rules that enable WTO Members to free trade by making
And it
voluntary trade concessions on a multilateral basisl
discourages WTO Members from engaging in certain kinds of trade
discrimination against trading partners that are also Members of the
WTO-based multilateral trading system. Among all the more thanat last count-twenty-seven thousand pages of WTO rules and
concessions, three basic rules are perhaps the most significant and
the most central to. this WTO system of concessions and nondiscrimination.
The first is the basic rule on binding concessions. This first rule
has been the key to the historic success of the WTO-based system in
stimulating growth in both the volume and the variety of world trade.
This rule establishes an agreed framework for voluntary trade
concessions that increase market access by lowering tariff barriers to
trade worldwide. WTO Members are not required to make tariff
concessions. But, under this vital and fundamental WTO rule, once
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WTO Members do make tariff concessions, and once they agree to
31
"bind" those concessions, they are bound by them.
The second is the basic rule requiring "most-favoured-nation," or
"MFN," treatment. Contrary to what many in the media-and, alas,
some in politics-seem to think, this is not a rule that requires that
more favorable treatment be given to one trading partner than to
others, but, instead, a rule that requires that the same treatment be
given to all foreign producers of like products that is given to
3' 2
producers from the "most-favoured-nation.
The rule requiring "most-favoured-nation" treatment, when
applied in concert with the rule on binding concessions, multiplies the
potential of trade concessions for lowering barriers to trade worldwide
by requiring that any concession that is made to one WTO Member
must be made also to all other WTO Members on a multilateral
"most-favoured-nation" basis. This is an important example of what
advocates of the WTO usually mean when we speak, as we often do,
of the virtues of what is called, in WTO jargon., "multilateralism."
The third basic rule is the rule' requiring "national treatment."
The "national treatment" rule prevents the favoring of domestic over
foreign producers.
Under this rule, WTO Members must not
discriminate in favor of domestic producers but, rather, must, with
respect to domestic taxes and other regulatory treatment, give "no
less favourable treatment" to foreign producers than is given to
domestic producers of like products. 33 The "national treatment" rule
is a good example of how WTO rules relating to international trade
can also have considerable domestic implications for WTO Members
in areas that do not primarily involve trade.
The availability and the advantages of these basic WTO rules
help explain why so many countries and other customs territories
have become Members of the WTO, and also why so many more are
waiting in line to become Members of the WTO. The enforceability of
these and many other beneficial WTO rules in WTO dispute
settlement adds all the more to the attractiveness of WTO
membership.
Benefits that can be assured through effective
enforcement are benefits that are well worth having.

31.

Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral

Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, art. II,

LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE

URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1995) [hereinafter Final Act].
32.

See Final Act, supra note 31, art. I; General Agreement on Trade in

Services, Dec. 15, 1993, art. IV, 33 I.L.M. 44 [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
33.
See Final Act, supra note 31, art. III; GATS, supra note 32; TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 32, art. III.
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The disputes that are appealed to us and that are discussed
around our table are about the meaning of these three basic rules,
and are also about the meaning of all the many, many other
obligations that are contained in the "covered agreements." These
obligations are expressed in the words of the treaty. The meaning of
the words of the treaty is thus our constant focus in reaching and
rendering our judgments. As we noted in our very first appeal, this
focus is in keeping with the international rules of treaty
interpretation that have been codified in the Vienna Convention on
34
the Law of Treaties.
Our focus on the words of the WTO treaty is as it should be. The
WTO treaty contains WTO rules. The Appellate Body exists to clarify
WTO rules in WTO dispute settlement. Yet, as we also noted in our
very first appeal, WTO rules cannot, in WTO dispute settlement, be
35
viewed in "clinical isolation" from other international law.
Our responsibility in every appeal is to say everything about the
meaning of the words of the treaty that must be said in order to
"address" the legal issues that are "raised" in that appeal, and thus
assist the WTO Members in resolving that dispute with a "positive
solution." Our aim in every appeal is to do that-only that-and no
more.
Some may say that, from time to time, we may have gone too far
by ruling on some of the legal issues that have been raised on appeal.
I would disagree. And, in reply, I would reiterate that, under the
WTO treaty, we must rule on every issue that is raised on appeal.
The treaty mandates that we "shall address" every such issue. We
have no discretion not to do so.
Unavoidably, this means that we are often compelled by the
fulfillment of our responsibilities under the WTO treaty to rule on
important legal issues when some who have not raised those issues
on appeal might prefer that we would refrain from ruling. Even so, I
would maintain that a careful reading of our rulings would lead most
fair-minded observers to conclude that, while fulfilling our
responsibilities under the WTO treaty, we have consistently shown a
great measure of restraint. Our approach always has been one, if you
will, of "quasi-judicial" restraint.
Some may say also that some of our rulings may have added to
the obligations of Members of the WTO under the WTO treaty. I
would disagree. Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding that is part of the WTO treaty says clearly, with

34.
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WTO Doc. WT/DS2/ABIR, at 17 (May 20, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 603, 620 [hereinafter
U.S.--Gasoline]; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691 (1969).
35.
U.S.--Gasoline, supra note 34, at 16.
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respect to the Dispute Settlement Body, the DSB, that:
"Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish
36
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."
Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
says clearly that this prohibition applies both to the panels and to the
Appellate Body.3 7 In all our recommendations and rulings, we have
been true to these responsibilities.
The WTO treaty is like any other international treaty. It is the
product of international compromise. In the past seven years, we
have learned that the meaning of some of the words of the WTO
treaty is sometimes seen clearly by different WTO Members in clearly
different ways. What one Member may see as only an argument may
be seen by another Member as an obligation, and vice versa. The
difference must sometimes be discerned in the process of dispute
settlement because this is what dispute settlement is all about. And
the fact that the meaning that one Member may happen to seehowever clearly-for a particular word or provision or obligation does
not happen to prevail in a considered and reasoned judgment, after a
full and fair hearing, and after many months of dispute settlement,
does not mean that the DSB has either added to or diminished the
rights and obligations of that Member that are provided in the
"covered agreements." 38
Some may say also that we may not have been true in some of
our rulings to the "standard of review" that is established in the WTO
treaty for the review of national decision-making in WTO dispute
settlement. Here, again, I would disagree. And I would invite them
to read carefully both the WTO treaty and our interpretations of the
WTO treaty relating to the issue of the appropriate "standard of
review." They will find that we have been true, consistently, to all
that the WTO treaty says about the "standard of review." What they
seem to be seeking is a "standard of review" different from the one on
which all WTO Members have agreed and which all WTO Members
have included in the WTO treaty. But it is not our place on the
Appellate Body to provide for a "standard of review" different from
the one that has been included in the WTO treaty. For, again, as the
treaty says, it is not our place, in dispute settlement, either to "add to
or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements."
Some may say also that some cases have been brought in WTO
dispute settlement that should never have been brought before the
WTO. In some instances, I might agree. But it is not up to me to

36.
37.
38.

DSU, supra note 2, art. 3.2.
Id. art. 19.2.
Id.
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decide which cases should be brought before the WTO. That is a
decision that, by right, is made only by the Members of the WTO.
The Members alone bring the cases. And, to quote the WTO treaty,
"Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as to
' 39
whether action under these procedures would be fruitful.
And, lastly, some may say as well that some decisions have been
made in appeals in WTO dispute settlement that should, ideally, have
been made instead by the Members of the WTO through multilateral
Here, too, in some
negotiations leading to WTO rule-maiking.
instances, I might agree. But it is neither my role nor my place to
make suggestions to the Members of the WTO about their rulemaking. The Members of the WTO have established an effective
system for settling disputes about existing rules. It is for the
Members of the WTO to decide how best to establish an effective
system for making new rules.
You tell me. Which makes better sense? Should the Members of
the WTO unravel an effective system for settling disputes about
existing rules because they have not yet established an effective
system for making new rules? Or, should the Members of the WTO
try instead to establish a system for making new rules that will be as
effective as the system they already have for settling disputes about
existing rules? To intone one of the many truisms of which we
sometimes seem so enamored in international law, but without the
usual, obligatory Latin phrasing: "don't fix what ain't broke"; fix only
what needs fixing.
In sum, I will say this to the critics of the various outcomes of
various cases thus far in WTO dispute settlement. I will leave it to
others to tote up the tally of supposed "wins" and "losses" for
individual Members of the WTO in individual cases in dispute
settlement. And I will trust every Member of the WTO to remember
that the entire national interest of no Member is to be found in the
outcome of any one, single case. Rather, the overriding and abiding
national interest of every Member of the WTO is to be found instead
in the shared international interest of all Members in the continued
success and strengthening of the WTO dispute settlement system.
And, because I am an American, I will be so bold as to add: this is
especially true of the largest economy in the world and the largest
trading nation in the world-the United States of America. And we
must never forget it.
From the conclusion of the Jay Treaty, to the settlement of the
Alabama Claims, to the establishment of the Hague Court, to the
conference at Bretton Woods, to the establishment of the United
Nations, to the agreement on the GATT, to the creation at long last of

39.

Id. art. 3.7.
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the WTO, the United States has always been in the forefront of
international efforts to achieve peace and prosperity in a better world
through the international rule of law. Together with others of like
mind around the world, we must always be in the forefront of those
seeking and serving the rule of law-whatever the political pressures
or the passing sentiments of any one case or any one day. We must
continue to summon the will and the wisdom to see that our true
national interest is the international rule of40 what the Constitution of
the United States calls "the law of nations."
This will not always be easy. A few weeks before I was first
elected to the Congress in 1990, while riding from campaign event to
campaign event amid the lush palmetto brush of Central Florida, I
happened to read a column by the journalist Michael Kinsley in The
New Republic. I agreed then with what he wrote about the true test
of international law, long before there was a WTO or an Appellate
Body. I certainly agree now. What Kinsley wrote then is good advice
for all Members of the WTO, and for all of us who support the work of
the WTO, as, together, we seek and serve the international rule of
law:
Usefulness of international law depends on others believing that this
time we really mean it. Really meaning it means giving up our own
freedom of action on occasion, and allowing our own case-by-case moral
assessments to be constrained by rules that will sometimes strike us as
wrong.... Law that need not be obeyed if you disagree with it is not
law. If we want meaningful international law to be available when we
41
find it useful, we must respect it even when we don't.

No effort is spared by the Members of the Appellate Body in the
energies we devote to reaching the decisions that are reflected in our
The
rulings. In particular, this is true of our deliberations.
deliberations around our table are the closest I am ever likely to come
to the conversations that enlivened the taverns of Samuel Johnson's
London and the salons of Voltaire's Paris. Intellectual sallies sail
back and forth. Verbal parries go to and fro. The rhetoric around the
table ascends gradually from engaging repartee up to rarefied
considerations worthy of the best of medieval Thomistic angel42
counting on the head of a pin.

Professor John H. Jackson of Georgetown University, who has
done so much through the decades to further the development of the

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
40.
41.
Michael Kinsley, TRB From Washington, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 1,1990, at 4.
42.
According to my esteemed former colleague Judge Florentino "Toy"
Feliciano, the answer to the time-honored question, "How many angels can dance on
the head of a pin?," is "None." For angels have no corporeal existence. On this, I defer
to my friend Toy, who was well schooled, not only by Yale University, but also by the
Jesuits in the Philippines.
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world trading system, and who has followed the development of the
WTO dispute settlement system as closely as anyone, has speculated
on what transpires around our table: "[O]ne can almost visualize the
furrowed brows of the Appellate Body Members as they struggle with
difficult concepts, balancing important social policies that often pose
dilemmas or trade-offs, and arriving sometimes at language that is
extraordinarily nuanced and delicate, sometimes discussed into late
hours of the evening. '4 3 As my late friend and colleague Chris Beeby
would undoubtedly say if he were still with us, "Indeed."
Brows furrowed, we take turns speaking. There are no time
limits, other than those of mutual tolerance. There are no holds
barred in our spirited Socratic fray. There are no occasions when we
do not endeavor to take into consideration every conceivable point of
view relating to every legal issue raised on appeal. There are no
resources from which any one of us might not draw in our efforts to
reach a "consensus" on the appropriate interpretation of the words of
the "covered agreements." Through the years, I have heard everyone
from Aristotle to General Ulysses S. Grant cited as authority around
our table.
I am a reformed politician. In my time in Congress, I was rarely
asked a question that I had not already been asked a hundred times
before. And I always had, if not an answer, then at least a response.
In my time on the Appellate Body, I have learned that, when I come
to our table, I had better have answers.
When I first became a candidate for the Congress, my longtime
friend and mentor, former Florida Governor and former U.S. Trade
Representative Reubin Askew, told me, 'Your time for reading and
reflection is over." To a certain extent, he was right about the
Congress. In contrast, my experience has been entirely different on
the Appellate Body. My years on the Appellate Body have been years
of much reading and much reflection in search of the right answers.
The panel record in every appeal consists of thousands of pages.
The submissions in every appeal are lengthy. And every appeal
increasingly involves issues that require much reading and reflection
on other appeals, other rulings, and other relevant considerations.
So, in every appeal, each of us brings with us to our table and to our
deliberations long hours of both reading and reflection. In every
appeal, each of us brings with us preparation for provisional positions
in which we try to take into account all the necessary questions about
all the pending issues. Then, together, through mutual thought, and
through considerable mutual criticism, we try, in every appeal, to find
the right answers.

43.

Jackson, supranote 15, at 110.
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The free mutual criticism that is the key to the success of a free
society has also been the key to the success of our deliberations.
Those who have endured our interrogations in our oral hearings know
the extent of our devotion on the Appellate Body to the strictures of
the Socratic method. They might be pleased to know that the mutual
interrogation in which we engage among ourselves in our
deliberations is no less intensive. Intellectually, there are "no holds
barred" in our search for the right answers to the questions raised on
appeal.
As we deliberate, the empty coffee cups accumulate. The water
pitcher is filled, emptied, and filled again. The table piles high with
legal briefs. The nearby blackboard fills with numbers and charts.
The bright young lawyers scurry in and out of the room as we tie up
loose language and loose ends. The pages of the parties' submissions
on appeal are scrutinized and analyzed. The arguments made by the
parties at the oral hearing in the appeal are recalled and recited. The
nuances of past appeals are revisited. The implications for future
appeals are considered. The debate back and forth across the table
ranges from the meaning of a comma to the meaning of life. And,
slowly, a "consensus" emerges.
By far the most rewarding experience for me as a Member of the
Appellate Body has been the intellectual communion in which I have
shared around our table. For, time after time, around our table, we
have, after exhaustive mutual effort, made seven minds into one. In
between sips of renvers6, we have shaped a "consensus" that has
helped the Members of the WTO shape a better world.
The Appellate Body is still new. WTO dispute settlement is still
new. The WTO itself is still new. All these are institutions still in
their infancy internationally, and still very much in the making as
ways of serving a global economy and an increasingly "globalized"
world.
Shortly after my appointment to the Appellate Body, and shortly
before my first official trip to Geneva and to the new WTO seven
years ago, my friend Mickey Kantor, who was then the U.S. Trade
Representative, told me, "I envy you your task. You will be present at
the creation."
He was right. I have been "present at the creation" of the WTO.
And much has been created by the WTO for the world, and for the
future of the world, in the past seven years. Yet we must all be
mindful that, where the historic task of the WTO is concerned, we are
all, still, very much "present at the creation." There is much more
that must be done. There is much more that must be created.
Ours is very much a work in progress in the work of progress
that is the WTO. Even now, the Members of the WTO are looking for
ways to improve the WTO dispute settlement system. I would be the
first to say that the system can be improved.
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Yet, whatever additional improvements may be needed,
whatever our inevitable human failings and frailties may be, I do,
passionately, believe this: Our work around our table in Geneva is
making a historic contribution to international trade, to international
law, and to the establishment of the international rule of law. And,
for this reason, our work at the WTO is an important part of the work
for human freedom. As we slice logic and sip renvers6 around our
table in Geneva, we are working, above all, for freedom. For, without
the rule of law, there is no freedom.

